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Introduction 
 
The paper introduces the most recent processes taking place within the Hungarian 
administrative sanctioning system. These include the realignment discernible between 
subjective and objective sanctions, with the latter gaining more and more ground. It discusses 
how the Constitutional Court evaluated the changes and showed that according to the 
constitutional body the state – complying with such legal principles as the rule of law or the 
requirement of human dignity – has the opportunity to implement changes within the scope of 
the sanctioning system with the aim of enforcing administrative law. In 2012, however, 
several important changes took place simultaneously. The new Act on Offenses shifted 
towards criminal law while it terminated the right of local governments to regulate offenses. 
In parallel with this, the Act on Local Governments at the beginning provided an opportunity 
for the local governments to sanction anti-social behavior which was revoked by the 
Constitutional Court in the same year. The paper investigates the effect of the decision and 
analyzes the opportunities of local governments within the present legal framework to create 
sanctions and defines those criteria on the basis of which the legislator could settle the current 
situation. 
 
I. Antecedents 
 
The Fundamental Law of Hungary took effect on 1 January 2012 as the fundamental rule of 
constitutionality and it induced the extensive reexamination and reframing of the legal system. 
As part of this process, the new law on local self-governments was created in 2011 and the 
new law on offences (misdemeanors) was created in 2012. In many respects, it has started a 
new chapter in the history of administrative criminal jurisdiction. In parallel with this change 
the system of public administration was transferred also significant.  
 
Following the political transformation in Hungary, Act II of 2012 is already the third law on 
offences to be applied in our country, however, in many respects jurisdiction has not reached 
a point of rest this time either. A basic way of subdividing the administrative sanctioning 
system is to distinguish between subjective and objective sanctions. Such division also has 
major practical significance. The most important constitutional change recently has been the 
realignment of these two groups with an obvious shift towards objective sanctions. This 
process was clearly speeded up by the Act on Offences adopted in 2012. This legislation, on 
the one hand, significantly decreased the number of (petty) offences by terminating the right 
of local governments or other public administrative bodies to sanction offences. On the other 
hand, it repelled the so far so typical Janus-faced nature of offences, as the legal institution 
shifted it towards criminal law and anti-administration was even eliminated from the 
preamble specifying the objectives of the legislator. 
 
The realignments that took place in the sanctioning system could be perceived even earlier, 
although they have received wider publicity due to the introduction of the so-called objective 
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traffic fines in 2007. 3  This time the legislator transferred certain actions, speeding for 
example, that until then belonged to offences and were protected by offence guarantees, into 
the realm of objective sanctions (also). This reclassification was only partial at the beginning 
but became complete later on. This was the first time that it arose significantly that the state 
shall specify certain criteria that can be applied to administrative sanctioning. The situation 
was complicated by the fact that neither the former Constitution, nor the current Fundamental 
Law include expressis verbis any stipulations regarding the administrative sanctioning system, 
thus, in its resolutions, the Constitutional Court had to deduct those criteria that have to be 
considered in this matter from the general principles.  
II. The Realignments of the Administrative Sanctioning System  
 
Resolution no. 498/D/2000 examined the relationship between the Constitution and the 
sanctions specifically, which at that time already acknowledged the free discretion of the 
legislator in connection with the regulation of the sanction’s application conditions and degree 
of the sanction by claiming that this discretion is limited by the stipulations of the 
Constitution. Such a standard should suit especially the principle of the rule of law or personal 
freedom and human dignity.4 
 
Constitutional Court decision no. 60/2009. (V. 28.)5 , establishing the constitutionality of 
objective traffic fines, acknowledged the objective sanctions based on statutory laws starting 
from the common basis of administrative sanctions. In this decision, the Constitutional Court 
stated that objective responsibility in itself is not unconstitutional and is not against the 
principle of the rule of law. In traffic, major emergencies can occur, as a result of which there 
is an overriding public interest related to the observance of traffic rules. The latter can be 
enforced by the state by means of sanctions, which makes it possible that the offending party 
shall take responsibility for his/her behavior. According to the opinion of the constitutional 
forum, the objective sanctions (that in the public opinion are perceived as the non-guilty 
offender being fined) do not threaten legal security, to the contrary, they encourage and 
facilitate it. The legislator is free to decide what form of liability it establishes within the 
frameworks of the particular branch of law, this way it also has the opportunity to create a 
new field of law besides the already existing branches, thus also reflecting on and reacting to 
new social phenomena. In this respect efficiency is a key factor, which is clearly promoted by 
the almost unavoidable sanctions. 
 
The strict liability of operators that is independent of culpability is not unconstitutional either 
if it meets the following criteria: the norm containing the sanction and the presumption of 
liability has a clean and fair content and the presumption has to be rebuttable. In case the 
sanction fulfills these criteria, then the violation of the rule of law cannot be established. 
 
In connection with offences, the problem of the abuse of rights can also emerge, in view of 
those expressed in the Constitutional Court’s Resolution no. 31/1998. (VI. 25.). Based on the 
decision of the Constitutional Court “that stipulation is also unconstitutional that is against 
the mentioned prohibition because the legislator used a legal institution for a purpose not 
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intended within its legal system.” 6  In connection with the reclassification of offences to 
objective sanctions, the objective of the administrative sanction was the starting point, which 
is nothing else but the enforcement of administrative law, while one of the generally 
prevailing functions of administrative sanctions is prevention. The administrative fine 
strongly fulfills this function according to the body, while the grounds for exclusion of 
culpability are the characteristic feature of another branch of law, criminal law, the 
application of which is not a constitutional obligation. Therefore, according to the resolution, 
it is not an abuse of rights from the part of the legislator if in the case of administrative fines it 
does not stipulate the application of the presumption of innocence and the grounds for 
exclusion of culpability. 
 
However, from this decision it also follows that the offence sanctions become more 
independent in many respects and are separate from other administrative sanctions. Although 
offences currently belong to the realm of administrative law, as a branch of law, in their 
operation there are such principles of criminal law prevailing as the presumption of innocence 
or the grounds for exclusion of culpability. These principles, however, do not form a 
constitutional hindrance for the legislator to reclassify offences to objective sanctions due to 
preventive considerations and for the purposes of enforcing administrative law as an 
objective. This presumably does not apply to the typically criminal type offences, whose aim 
is not to enforce the administrative law. In connection with and exactly because of this Tibor 
Madarász already established it in 1989 that these exemplify that the objective of the 
administrative sanctions specified by law is wider than the theoretical objective, i.e. the 
enforcement of administrative law. 7  These actions were included in the offences law 
undoubtedly because of the need for decriminalization, however, their character affects 
offences as a whole and practically entails the need for higher level guarantees. 
III. The Constitutional Court’s Resolution no. 38/2012. (XI. 14.) 
 
The Constitutional Court’s resolution no. 38/2012. (XI. 14.) served as a milestone for several 
reasons. It evaluated the new Act on Offences of 2012 and classified it as belonging to 
criminal law at the same time, it stated that the then effective regulation of homelessness was 
unconstitutional, and annulled the stipulation of the Act on the Local Governments of 
Hungary authorizing local governments to create sanctions. According to the latter, the 
significantly antisocial behaviors can be penalized by means of fines and on-the-spot fines. 
 
In this decision the Constitutional Court expressly stated that the offence lost its role in the 
sanctioning of anti-administration behavior and its “petty criminal law” feature became 
dominant. As a result, the offence has practically become the third, most moderate level of the 
(not yet existing) trichotomous criminal law system, similarly to the rules of the misdemeanor 
criminal code. As a result of this, the already existing postulate has become general, stating 
that in the case of criminal offenses endangering human life, physical safety, health or law or 
violating accepted rules of cohabitation, the sanctioning can be of ultima ratio type. 
 
In line with the Constitutional Court’s 2011 decision discussing garbage picking, the 
management of social issues with sanctions was classified as unconstitutional and pointless. 
At this point it should be emphasized that due to the shifting of the offence area of law 
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towards criminal law, those criteria with which sanctioning can be evaluated have changed or 
at least seem to be changing. From now on, based on those mentioned above, it is its ultima 
ratio feature deriving from criminal law that is governing in terms of the necessity for the 
given regulation or sanction. Of course, the legislator has to consider the already existing 
regulatory environment as there are several types of behavior in the legal system that are 
related to the rules of cohabitation and the use of public spaces and hurt the rights of others or 
are a threat to public order. These include, among others, begging, breach of the peace, 
sanitation violation, prohibition of the consumption of alcoholic beverages, illegal gambling, 
endangering with dogs, breach of public morality or vandalism. In the case of the occurrence 
of these situations, the homeless person or any other person is already punishable, who is 
using the public space in a way threatening public order.  
 
In connection with homelessness specifically, the constitutional body has stated that the fact 
that the use of public spaces for habitual residence carries in itself the violation of other 
people’s rights, the possibility for the threat to public order, cannot be deemed as a legitimate 
reason for criminalization. In harmony with Constitutional Court resolution no. 176/2011. 
(XII. 29.), it was confirmed in general as well that the abstract constitutional values relating to 
public order and peace in themselves cannot justify the creation of preventive-type offence 
situations. “Otherwise the majority of activities in public spaces could be sanctioned as these 
in a lot of cases have a negative effect on the image of the city, the wellbeing of the residents 
and in most cases are noisy.”8 
 
These findings, therefore, have set a general limit for the local governments with respect to 
what antisocial rules they want to sanction and it was made clear that preventive reasons in 
themselves do not necessarily provide enough justification. It shall also be considered, 
however, that the above mentioned resolution was passed specifically in connection with the 
offences that have become more criminal-law-like, which criteria may change in case of non-
offence type sanctioning, as the fundamental objective of administrative sanctioning is to 
make people observe the administrative rules, thus the question might even be asked in the 
following way: what kind of administrative rules can be established and to what extent can 
local governments regulate cohabitation?  
 
The decision also stated that the legislator has to describe the objective of sanctioning in a 
clear way, as it is expected in connection with today’s regulation of homelessness as well. 
Amendment Four to the Fundamental Law remedied the problem with regard to homeless 
people because in Article XXII it specified those considerations in the case of which habitual 
residence in public spaces is against the law. These are the following: public order, public 
safety, public health and the protection of cultural heritage.9 
 
The 2012 decision touched upon another important issue at the same time: sanctioning by 
local governments, which by now does not mean the passing of offences at all. Of course, 
today the biggest question in this respect is whether such sanctions can be formed or not. The 
authorization granted by the Act on Local Governments would have made all this clear but 
this authorization was annulled by the Constitutional Court due to its bianco and endless 
nature.  
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The body, starting from the principle of the rule of law, confirmed in connection with the 
authorization that the authorization has to specify the scope and limits of the legislative 
power. The panel also examined if there is any other law that would limit the local 
government’s statutory authority to sanction but no other regulation besides the Act on the 
General Rules of Administrative Proceedings concerned this power. In this respect, the Act on 
the General Rules includes subsidiary-type rules compared to other financial rules (limitation 
period, considerations regarding the imposition of fines, etc.) besides certain rules of 
proceeding, which although provide procedural guarantees, are not suitable for remedying the 
shortcomings of the authorization. Moreover, the body considered the financial interest of the 
local governments problematic also, besides the fact that the authorization did not meet the 
requirement for the clarity of norms either. This way, for example, it could not be established 
either to which legal entities does the establishment of the sanction apply (natural persons or 
organizations, too). 
IV. The Sanction Power of Local Governments- de lege ferenda and de lege lata 
Although the resolution includes a certain reference to the fact that statutory authority is 
needed for sanctioning, the Act on Local Governments includes several rules currently as well 
with regard to which the establishment of such a sanction can be founded. 
 
According to the justification of the resolution, the imposition of such a fine or sanction as a 
legal consequence of illegal conduct which provides an opportunity for the application of state 
constraint does not belong to the scope of local public affairs. Such rules can be created by the 
local government only based on authorization by law – in accordance with Article 32 Section 
(2) paragraph 2 of the Fundamental Law – and within the framework of such authorization. 
Such legislation is in harmony with the requirement of the rule of law deriving from Article 
B) Section (1) of the Fundamental Law only with substantive law guarantees and clear 
authorization described by law.  
 
At the same time, Article 32, Section (2) of the Fundamental Law expressly stipulates that the 
local governments – acting within their function – can regulate independently such situations 
of life that are not regulated by other law, thus the enactment of the sanctioning decree cannot 
be deemed as one against the Fundamental Law. The principal tasks and functions of local 
governments are specified on the one hand by the Fundamental law, and on the other, by the 
Act on Local Governments. According to Article 4 of the Act on Local Governments, in 
connection with the notion of local public affairs, the creation of these stipulations may fall 
within the scope of specifying the conditions of cooperation with the public. In Article 143, 
Section (4), Point d) of the Act on Local Governments, the legislator expressly authorized the 
local governments to specify the “basic rules of cohabitation and the legal consequences of 
the failure to meet them.” 
 
As a justification for the function, Article 8, Section (1), Point b) of the Act on Local 
Governments might be called, on the basis of which members of the local community as 
subjects of the local government are obliged to observe and have others observe the basic 
rules of cohabitation and according to Section (2) the representative body of the local 
government may determine in its decree the content of the obligations included in Section (1) 
and the legal consequences of the failure to meet them. The reasoning attached to the Act on 
Local Governments also entails the option to sanction because the legislator in its reasoning 
clearly expressed the intention that the representative bodies of the local governments shall 
establish such sanctioning rules by decree (according to the reasoning, with extensive social 
support). 
 In consideration of the fact that the decision was not made specifically with regard to judging 
the constitutionality of sanctioning by local governments, based on the quoted rules of the Act 
on Local Governments, in my opinion the opportunity of local governments to pass decrees 
(with the qualified majority of the representative body) which regulate local social 
cohabitation and threaten to place sanctions against those violating these decrees, can still be 
verified.  
 
It is important, however, that the decree passed this way should really regulate a subject 
matter with regard to which there is no other regulation and the regulated living condition 
should not belong neither to the field of criminal law, offence law, nor to administrative law 
covered by national legislation. It should be noted that the report by the ombudsman also 
stated that such an enactment of regulations by the local government, in itself, is not against 
the law. It should be considered, however, that a clarifying rule should be created because the 
regulation has such cardinal points as the subject matter of the regulation, the organizational, 
procedural rules as well as the nature and exact scale of the sanction.  
 
Based on the above, I believe that the competition between administrative objective and 
subjective sanctions seems to be decided nationally for the objective sanctions. Questions 
regarding reclassification do not pose a problem anymore because the further life of offences 
existing as subjective sanctions has become questionable and their existence as administrative 
sanctions has been questioned as well. 
 
The new direction is represented by objective sanctions, which due to the amendment of the 
Act on General Rules have received uniform substantive law rules as well. The most 
interesting question nowadays is if the local governments are granted the opportunity for 
sanctioning, and if yes, then according to what rules. Can there be an administrative criminal 
law as a result of this new regulation or this will remain only an attempt? These questions can 
be answered partly from the legislator’s point of view and if the answer is yes, then new 
significant questions emerge: namely, what kind of situations do the local governments wish 
to sanction? 
 
Constitutionally, a reassuring framework, of course, would be provided by higher level legal 
regulation, within which the field of administrative criminal law10 may emerge as protected 
by guarantees and clarified dogmatically. All this is important also because among the rules 
there can be such diverse situations that touch upon issues of human rights in many cases. A 
significant part of rules enacted between January and November 2012 also touched upon such 
constitutionally sensitive issues as garbage picking, begging and similar situations. This 
tendency will obviously prevail as these socially most sensitive areas are those that affect the 
local community as a whole. 
 
Constitutional Court resolution no. 29/2015. (X. 2.) found the regulation power of local self-
governments constitutional and it is decided the question and declared, that local governments 
can regulate offences against “peaceful public coexistence”. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Based on those discussed above, the objective sanctions are increasingly winning ground in 
the Hungarian administrative sanctioning system against subjective offenses. This tendency 
was continued by the Act on Offenses of 2012 as after it took effect several actions that had 
been sanctioned as offenses previously were recategorized as objective administrative 
sanctions while the right of local governments to legislate offenses was terminated.  In order 
to balance the latter, the legislator provided the opportunity first in the Act on Local 
Governments of Hungary for the local governments to establish anti-social situations. As a 
result of this, until November 2012 699 such regulations were created in total, however, after 
Constitutional Court resolution no. 38/2012. (XI. 14.) even these had to be repealed. The idea 
came at this time that local governments could pass sanctioning regulations based on the 
Fundamental Law within original legislative competence as well. These regulations, however, 
still do not have a uniform legal basis, dogmatic, or procedural rules. For the time being, the 
regional government offices are trying to prevent the process using persuasion in order to 
avoid further problems.  
 
As opposed to this, the solution could be for the state to move the creation of local 
government sanctions into a realm regulated by law and protected by guarantees by further 
expanding the uniform legal bases of objective legal sanctions. All this is especially important 
because the local governments, based on the above, often regulate areas that are closely 
related to human rights. Such guarantees could include the definition of the scope of 
sanctioning organizations and the decision whether negligence is necessary for committing 
these actions or if we can talk only about the sanctioning of objective-based administrative 
irregularities. It should also be regulated what the type and amount of the fine can be and how 
execution can take place. These rules could be placed in the Act on Administrative Procedural 
Rules or the Act on Offenses as well. In establishing the constitutionality of the created 
regulations, the regional government offices should also participate actively, so that those 
frameworks can be established as soon as possible within which sanctioning can take place in 
accordance with the rule of law. Along this way – similarly to the previous local government 
offenses – the requirement could be met according to which the local governments should 
have the opportunity to establish sanctioning rules adequate for the local circumstances, while 
the state  have already eliminated these actions from the offenses assuming an increasingly 
criminal law character. 
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Absztrakt11 
 
A tanulmány a magyar közigazgatási szankciórendszer körében végbemenő legújabb 
folyamatokat mutatja be. Ezek közé tartozik a szubjektív és objektív szankciók között 
megfigyelhető átrendeződés, ahol egyre inkább tért nyernek az utóbbiak. Végigköveti, hogy a 
változásokat az Alkotmánybíróság hogyan értékelte és rámutat, hogy az alkotmányos testület 
álláspontja szerint az államnak – olyan jogi elveket betartva, mint a jogállamiság elve vagy az 
emberi méltóság követelménye - lehetősége van arra, hogy a szankciórendszer körében a 
közigazgatási jog érvényre juttatása érdekében változásokat hajtson végre, így akár a 
szubjektív szankciók közül az objektív szankciók közé soroljon át tényállásokat. Ezen 
változások között szerepel a nagy vitákat kiváltó objektív közigazgatási bírságok bevezetése 
is, amely új szabályozást az Alkotmánybíróság a 60/2009 (V. 28.) határozata kifejezetten is 
alkotmányosnak mondta ki az állam életvédelmi kötelezettségére is hivatkozással. 2012-ben 
több fontos változás zajlott le egyszerre. Az új szabálysértési törvény a büntetőjog irányába 
mozdult el, miközben megszüntette a helyi önkormányzatok azon jogát, hogy szabálysértést 
statuáljanak önkormányzati rendelet által. Ezzel párhuzamosan a Magyarország helyi 
önkormányzatairól szóló törvény eleinte egy felhatalmazás alapján lehetőséget adott a helyi 
önkormányzatoknak közösségellenes magatartások szankcionálására, amelyet később az 
Alkotmánybíróság még ugyanebben az évben elvont a 38/2012. (XI. 14.) AB határozat 
nyomán, megsemmisítve az említett parttalannak minősített felhatalmazást. A határozat 
emellett azonban más lényeges megállapításokat is tett, így a hajléktalanság szankcionálásáról 
történt állásfoglalás mellett részletesen elemezte, hogy az új szabálysértési törvény büntető 
jellege milyen szabályozási elemekben nyilvánul meg. A tanulmány foglalkozik a döntés 
hatásával, elemzi, hogy a helyi önkormányzatoknak a jelenlegi jogi keretek között - amelyet 
az Alkotmánybíróság 29/2015. (X. 2.) határozata is megerősített- milyen lehetőségük van 
szankcióalkotásra, valamint meghatározza azon szempontokat, amely mentén a jogalkotó a 
helyzetet rendezhetné. A 2012 után kialakult gyakorlat nyomán ugyanis a helyi 
önkormányzatok részben felhatalmazás nélkül, részben visszautalva az önkormányzati 
törvény azon rendelkezésére, amely szerint a közösségi együttélés szabályrendszerét 
meghatározhatja a képviselő-testület, egyre több ilyen szankcionáló rendeletet alkotott. Ezek 
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jogellenessége nem volt már kezdetben sem magától értetődő, hiszen a képviselő-testület 
szabályozási joga nyilvánvalóan kiterjedt az említett területre, ugyanakkor a helyzetet 
nehezítette, hogy a szankcionálás keretrendszerét és sarokpontjait a jogalkotó nem jelölte ki. 
Minden hasonló anomália ellenére egyre több ilyen rendelet született, amelyek megalkotását 
az Alkotmánybíróság az említett döntés nyomán immáron legalizálta. 
 
 
 
